Feb 21st
2015
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21644237-greece-had-chance-make-euro-zone-work-better-it-blew-it-syrizas-scattergun?fsrc=scn/tw/te/pe/ed/syrizasscattergun
CLIP-CLOPPING
around Europe over the past few weeks, Yanis
Varoufakis , Greece ’s
dashing finance minister, has urged the euro zone to chart a new course.
Endlessly forcing new loans upon indebted countries like Greece in the
pretence that they will one day be repaid, he argued, was a strategy for
depression and deflation. “The disease that we’re facing in Greece ,” he
told the BBC, “is that a problem of insolvency for five years has been treated
as a problem of liquidity.”
This view
would not seem outlandish in the academic world that Mr Varoufakis recently
quit. Few believe that Greece ’s
debts, worth over 175% of GDP, will ever be repaid in full. But saying so
betrayed a woeful misunderstanding of the euro zone’s rules. If the European
Central Bank shared Mr Varoufakis’s view, it would have to cut off Greek banks,
potentially driving Greece
out of the euro. Indeed, earlier this month, when the minister visited the ECB
in Frankfurt , Mario Draghi, its president,
snippily told him to keep his opinion to himself. He has not repeated it since.
Mr
Varoufakis’s gaffe is a mere footnote in a list of mishaps that have
characterised Greece ’s
miserable experience in the euro. But it is depressingly typical for a
government that, for all its high popularity at home, has squandered every
opportunity to improve its lot, and ultimately that of the euro zone. Even as
Mr Varoufakis and his colleagues in Greece ’s ruling Syriza party have
loftily declared that the changes they seek would benefit all Europeans, not
just Greeks, their negotiating strategy has been small-minded, self-defeating
and naive.
Some of
this may be put down to inexperience. A few Europeans were guilty of assuming
that Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister, would perform what Greeks call a
kolotoumba (“somersault”) the instant he took office. But Syriza has no excuse
for making idle references to the Nazi occupation of Greece . Nor has it helped by
playing games with its partners in the Eurogroup of finance ministers. European
officials have been incensed by a Hellenic habit of leaking supposedly private
discussion papers.
The
wrangling over whether to extend Greece ’s second bail-out, which
expires on February 28th, has shown Mr Tsipras’s government at its worst.
Admittedly Syriza was dealt a bad hand by its predecessor, which before
Christmas accepted an extension of only two months. But rather than accept an
extension, Mr Tsipras and Mr Varoufakis have dug in their heels, robotically
insisting on a “bridging” deal that would unlock euro-zone funding while
allowing the government to slow or reverse reforms. Greece ’s creditors, unsurprisingly,
were unimpressed. On February 19th Greece put forward a more
conciliatory proposal to extend its loan. But this was almost immediately
rebuffed by Germany .
Trust has seemingly been so grievously eroded that Greek promises of discipline
are not worth much in Berlin .
These spats
matter far beyond the hurt feelings of a few politicians. Greece’s survival in
the euro depends on two factors largely outside its control: the willingness of
the ECB to keep its banks on life support, and that of the Eurogroup to strike
a long-term financing deal (Mr Varoufakis avoids the term “bail-out”) to keep the
country afloat. It has weakened its hand on both fronts.
The ECB’s
reasoning will rest in part on its assessment of the health of Greek banks.
Depositors are withdrawing around €2 billion ($2.3 billion) a week. Syriza’s
stubbornness has hardened attitudes on the ECB’s council. On February 18th, it
offered only a small increase in liquidity support; and the support will end
entirely if two-thirds of its members say so. Some are reported to favour
capital controls as a better option. Greece will be on perilous terrain
if it enters March without a deal in place.
As for a
long-term deal, Germany and
others have dangled sweeteners before Greece , including an easing of debt
terms and a lower primary-surplus target. But these are prizes to be won at the
end of talks, not the beginning. Syriza has already started to reverse some
reforms, including privatisations and collective-bargaining rules, antagonising
its creditors further. The Eurogroup will probably not withdraw its fiscal
offers but, with trust in the Greeks at zero, the reform conditions that it
will attach to a third bail-out will surely be tougher than ever.
Time is short,
particularly if the Eurogroup fails to agree with Greece on the terms for a bail-out
extension. Thanks to a collapse in tax revenues, the government could run out
of cash before an IMF bond falls due in March. By squeezing suppliers and
raiding funds, Greece
may be able to finance itself for a few months, but without further help it
will certainly be unable to meet debt repayments to the ECB in July and August.
Isolation
is rarely splendid
Yet an
essential formula remains unchanged: that neither Greece nor its partners want to see
it forced out of the euro (although the odds of an accidental “Grexit” have
shortened). So at some point Mr Tsipras will have to perform his kolotoumba,
potentially at high cost. At home, having raised expectations of a big win (75%
of Greeks support his tough line) he might face calls for a referendum or a new
election.
The real
Greek tragedy is that, with a bit more statesmanship, Mr Tsipras could have
nudged Europe on to a happier path. The euro
zone desperately needs a counter-narrative to its failed German-inspired policy
of austerity. As leader of the hardest-hit economy, armed with a strong
democratic mandate, Mr Tsipras was well placed to offer one. He could have
sought allies against excessive austerity and for looser fiscal and monetary
policy in places like Italy
and France —and
even inside the ECB. Yet by quibbling over his debt extension and backtracking
so ostentatiously on sensible reform he has alienated more or less everyone.
That is quite some achievement.
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