AUG 5, 2015
@ 7:27 PM 1,536 VIEWS
Tim
Worstall
CONTRIBUTOR
After we
all thought that the Greek debt crisis was over we’re seeing disturbing signs
that it isn’t, not at all, quite over as yet. It’s not just the absence of the
fat lady in the horned helmet signing as yet that indicates it either. We have
two rather different processes going on, both of them leading to the
possibility that the solution just isn’t going to be found and that exit from
the euro and default will follow. The first is that the IMF is now doing what
it always should have done, which was obey its own charter. This means it
should not fund any deal which is not sustainable: something it clearly ignored
in funding the last deal. The second is that the Greek economy has deteriorated
even more than anyone thought it had meaning that the necessary debt relief
bill is even higher. Quite possibly to the point where no one’s willing to bear
it.
That
analysis of the Greek economy comes from a British outfit:
One
potential stumbling block to an agreement is the insistence of the IMF that it
will not take part in a third bail out unless Greece ’s debt is cut by 30%.
The NIESR
report said that an even bigger cut of 55% was needed to give Greece a chance
of reducing its debt to 120% of GDP by 2020. It warned that continuing to
insist on “unrealistic fiscal targets” will ensure that the Greek economy will
“remain in depression”. The report said: “According to our modelling, restoring
debt sustainability requires a debt write-off equivalent to at least 55% of
GDP, higher than the IMF’s estimate of 30%.”
As another
report has it:
In a stark
analysis, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) laid
bare the impact of VAT hikes and strict budget targets that it said could
become “self-defeating”.
This isn’t
because they’re using a different model or even different economics than
everyone else. It’s just that they’re taking into account the effects of a near
month long close down of the banks, the crumbling of the Greek economy as a
result of that.
And this,
of course, sets us all up for another set of arguments. On the German, and
therefore at least part of the EU side, there’s an insistence that there cannot
be a haircut on the Greek debt. It’s true, the treaty does say something along
those lines but the important point is that if that does happen then that’s Germany funding
another EU state. And Germany
knows very well what will happen if that does: Germany ends up funding a plethora
of EU states over time.
There’s
also another section of the EU side which insists that the IMF must be involved
in whatever rescue does happen. On the grounds that they want someone around
being a responsible adult. And then the IMF refuses to take part in a further
deal which is not sustainable: which, to them, means cuts in that headline
amount of debt. It’s not possible to craft a deal that pleases them all. Thus,
there’s a possibility that we won’t in fact get a deal.
Subsequently,
the IMF has said it will not participate unless Greek debts are written down
and unless Greece
can prove itself more committed than in previous bail-out programmes to
actually carrying through with reforms. That effectively means the IMF will not
take part at all. There is little to no chance of the main eurozone creditors
such as Germany
agreeing to further write-downs of Greek debt – especially not in a context in
which they are supposed to agree to provide it with a lot more.
Shrug,
well, it’s their bed, they made it, sweet dreams and all that. I’m on the
outside of this, insisting that firstly Greece should never have joined and
secondly, that once the crisis hit they should have defaulted and left the
euro. Should still do that now.
There is
one economic point that’s being made in the US . One that’s entirely true too,
as far as it goes. Which is that the losses from Grexit and default will be
higher (well, maybe they will, I have my doubts but still) than whatever new
amount of money needs to be put in. So, put up and shut up in order to save money.
Except
that’s not actually how the politics of this works. Almost all of the Greek
debt is owed to other eurozone governments (a bit to the IMF, a tiny sliver to
private actors, but most to eurozone governments through the EFSF, direct loans
and the ECB). OK, that’s fine, so they could write it off. In fact, they have
written a lot of it off by allowing the interest rates to be very low and
repayment terms very long indeed. So, economically, they’ve already lost the
money. Might as well just admit it and then tell everyone that the new money
going in is less than will be lost without it.
Except the
reason for those low interest rates and long maturities is so that they can
insist to their domestic electorates that the money hasn’t been lost. And
they’ve been swearing themselves blue in the face that this is so: Greece will pay
it all back even though everyone knows that some 50% of it is already lost and
gone through those loan terms. So there isn’t actually any political room for
those eurozone governments to turn around and admit that the money’s already
lost. Simply because they’ve been lying about it for so long.
As I say,
it’s not obvious that there’s going to be a solution to this. Other than the
one that should have happened 5 years ago: Grexit and default.
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