FEB 20, 2016 @ 08:40 PM 3,030 VIEWS
Paul Coyer , CONTRIBUTOR
I cover foreign policy with a focus on Eurasia.
FORBES
China’s extremely ambitious efforts under Xi Jinping to extend its reach around the globe and to put its economic clout to work aggressively pursuing its strategic goals have had considerable impact on Latin America. As I’ve written previously, the nature of Chinese economic engagement with Latin America, despite having some beneficial aspects, has also had long term negative economic and normative effects in the region and has strengthened anti-American regimes. China’s growing military presence in the region is having a similar effect, and, although it is still relatively limited, is serving to undermine, aided by Washington’s neglect, the United States’ strategic position in its own Hemisphere.
China’s attempts to increase its security presence within Latin America partly reflect Beijing’s desire to increase the sophistication of the types of Chinese manufactures it would like to sell in the region, and a big part of the growth of China’s economic footprint in the region has consisted of Chinese arms companies with close relationships to the Chinese military, such as the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC), China National Electronics Import & Export Corp (CEIEC) and China’s North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), all of which have been aggressively developing their position in Latin America. But the expansion of China’s security presence is also taking place within the context of Beijing’s intention to expand its military’s global reach in parallel with the rapidly expanding definition of China’s national interests. China’s Defense White Paper, which was made public last year, broadcast this fact, and signaled that Chinese leaders see the growth of the influence of China’s military around the world as an integral part of China’s ability to shape strategic outcomes and influence the choices of other nations.
Illustrating the anti-American tenor of Chinese engagement in the defense arena is the fact that sales of Chinese military hardware have entered the region mostly through states that share an anti-American foreign policy orientation, particularly the “ALBA” states (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, or “Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America”, founded by Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez with the aim of countering American influence in Latin America). Chinese resources to these states have allowed such virulently anti-American regimes as Venezuela’s to invite Iranian Quds forces to Latin America, and have indirectly enabled them to give basing rights to Russia, whose goal in gaining such rights is to challenge the United States in the Western Hemisphere and thus to enhance Moscow’s freedom of action in its own neighborhood.
China’s security footprint in the region has grown from a small base, expanding from the provision (through either sale or gifting) of small arms, clothing, and field hospitals, to trucks and munitions to the co-production of light helicopters to, more recently, the sale of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS’s) to Peru this past summer. China has also sold surface to air missiles (SAM’s) and towed guns to Bolivia, and SAMs and anti-tank missiles to Ecuador. Venezuela, by far the largest customer for Chinese military goods to date (as well as the largest Latin American purchaser of Russian military hardware), since mid 2000’s has purchased a variety of Chinese military hardware, including infantry fighting vehicles, short range air to air missiles, training aircraft and radar, as well as Shaanxi Y-8 medium transport and Harbin Z-9C anti-submarine helicopters.
In terms of dollar amounts, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which tracks weapons exports globally, Chinese military sales to the region have risen from almost nothing in 2005 to $100M in 2010 (of which approximately 90% was accounted for by Venezuela alone, with most of the remainder being accounted for by Ecuador), and to a new record high of $130M in 2014 (of which approximately 85% was accounted for by Venezuela, with the rest being accounted for by Bolivia).
China has also successfully initiated joint military maneuvers, such as its participation in bilateral special operations training in Peru in 2010, and in joint naval maneuvers in October 2013 in which two Chinese guided missile frigates undertook joint exercises with Chile, Argentina and Brazil. In the area of communications, the quickly growing role around the globe played by Huawei, which has close ties to China’s intelligence services and whose presence in Latin America has exploded in recent years, compliments China’s growing military footprint there by expanding the reach and capabilities of Chinese intelligence. As just one example of its large presence, Huawei has built six out of the seven 4G mobile phone networks in Brazil. China has also been active in the launch of communications satellites for Venezuela, Bolivia, and Brazil, with further satellite launches planned for each of those three countries, and the development and launch by Beijing Xinwei, a Chinese military communications company, of a satellite for Nicaragua, under the rule once again of Washington’s perennial foe Daniel Ortega. Wang Jing, the principle owner of Beijing Xinwei, is also the man backing China’s attempt to create a Nicaraguan Canal that is intended as an alternative to the Panama Canal.
Despite the fact that the United States no longer controls the Panama Canal, Beijing continues to assume that Washington would nevertheless take control in the event of major hostilities between the United States and China, potentially refusing transit to Chinese naval vessels. The proposed Chinese-built canal across Nicaragua faces so many challenges that it is unlikely to ever come to fruition. However, the fact that the Chinese have appeared to be serious about the project, undertaken in partnership with Ortega, indicates China’s goals in the region. As Gabriel Marcella, the former Director of the Americas Program at the US Army War College, stated, “The construction of the new channel cannot be conceived without a military alliance that provides an umbrella to such large investments that come, in particular, from China.” (The potential cost of the canal project is estimated at $40B, more than three times Nicaragua’s annual GDP.)
Another area of defense cooperation that Beijing has actively pursued has been exchanges between senior military officials from China and Latin America. Such exchanges began with ALBA states but have also included Brazil, Mexico, Suriname, and Chile. These exchanges have become institutionalized by China in the past four years, with Beijing hosting in late 2012 the first “China-Latin America High-Level Forum on Defense”, which included senior defense officials from Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador and Paraguay. The second such forum was held in 2014. Providing an indication of what Beijing hopes to gain from its increasingly close defense collaboration in the region, an Argentinian defense official was quoted in 2014 as saying that part of the purpose of the forum was “to foster understanding and to promote cooperation” between China and Latin American partners in areas such as China’s territorial claims on Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
Agreements signed a year ago in Beijing between China and Argentina’s then-President, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, have the potential to dramatically increase China’s security footprint in the region. How many of those agreements actually come to fruition remains to be seen, but the breadth of cooperation outlined a year ago would mark a significant step forward for Beijing and provide the Chinese with a springboard to replicate such defense cooperation elsewhere, serving to massively increase military-to-military interaction between China and regional players and to undermine the American position as the security partner of choice in Latin America.
Sino-Argentinian defense cooperation has expanded quickly in the past few years under Ms. Kirchner. Military education exchanges between the US and Argentina practically stopped under Kirchner, while an exchange program with the PLA was agreed in 2014. In 2014 Kirchner and China declared a “comprehensive strategic partnership”, the same term used by China and Venezuela to define their relationship, and had established a “Argentine-Chinese Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Fields of Defense, Technology and Industry” that has become the decision-making body for military cooperation.
During her February 2015 trip to Beijing, Kircher expressed a desire to purchase between 14-20 of China’s lightweight, multi-role fighter jet, the J-10, which previously had only been exported to Pakistan. The J-10 is a capable 4th generation combat fighter and is inexpensive, which makes it particularly attractive. Argentina’s public finances have been in such poor condition that the potential purchase of the J-10 was to have been funded by Chinese loans backed by Argentinian commodities. Chinese and Argentinian military officials discussed possible coproduction of the J-10, which would make it even more appealing to Argentina by involving Argentinian industry.
Last year’s talks in Beijing also resulted in tentative agreement that China build 5 corvettes for the Argentine Navy, and 3 of those are to be coproduced in Argentina, with the ships to be delivered in 2017. The two sides also agreed to coproduce at least 100 APC’s in Argentina, which are to be marketed for export elsewhere in the region. Most importantly to China’s communications reach and space presence, Argentina granted China the right to build a space tracking and control station in southern Argentina, to cost $300M, which will enable China to communicate with its satellites and download images and data from the southern hemisphere rather than having to wait until they cross over China. This tracking base will be staffed by the Chinese, and Argentinians themselves will have only extremely limited access to it, raising some concerns about its planned usage.
The defeat of Kirchner and the election late last November of center-right Mauricio Macri and the likelihood that Macri will want to pull China away from his predecessor’s geopolitical alignment with Russia, China, and the ALBA alliance, may result in his government pulling back from many of the tentative agreements discussed last year in Beijing – although the satellite tracking station was agreed to previously and was already under construction in 2014, so is not going to be negated. (And the more competent economic management that is already evident in Buenos Aires under Macri is also likely to give Argentina a greater number of international investors to choose from and thus reduce Argentina’s dependence upon China.) Changes have already been taking place in the military. Five weeks ago Macri announced that Argentina’s senior military leadership would be replaced, and the Argentinian Ministry of Defense announced two weeks ago that it had issued a “high priority request” to obtain engine replacements and other equipment to completely overhaul its aged fleet of American-made A-4AR Skyhawk fighters, which would indicate that Macri is backing away from the coproduction agreement with China and giving itself time to find another long-term solution.
The United States cannot depend upon good fortune to reduce China’s security presence in the Western Hemisphere and preserve the American position, however. Given China’s role as a major economic partner in the region, its growing political influence, and its intention to build itself into an important security partner within the region, the challenge to the United States is clear. As I wrote last month, the United States has been neglecting Latin America, which neglect has contributed to China’s ability to increase its influence at Washington’s expense. This neglect has also laid bare the lack of recognition in Washington of Latin America’s strategic importance to the United States. Dr. Evan Ellis of the US Army War College argued last autumn in testimony to the US Congress on Sino-American competition in Latin America that, “This government must do more to advance a vision of what it stands for, and why the US approach, if not always perfect, is the hemisphere’s best bet to advance development, prosperity and human dignity.” Whether Washington actually makes a concerted effort to follow Dr. Ellis’ advice is doubtful – it is, nevertheless, what is needed.
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