By Dimitri
B. Papadimitriou Aug 12, 2013 1:00 AM GMT+0300
At their
White House meeting last week, U.S. President Barack Obama assured Greek Prime
Minister Antonis Samaras of his support as Greece prepares for talks with
creditors on additional debt relief amid record-high unemployment.
The U.S. should
also endorse a new blueprint for recovery based on one of the most successful
economic assistance programs of the modern era: the Marshall Plan.
It is clear
by now that the European Union’s policies in Greece have failed. Projections
that government spending cutbacks would stop the economy’s free-fall proved to
be wildly optimistic. The 240 billion euro ($319 billion) bailout from the euro
area and International Monetary Fund has shown little sign of success, and Greece is
experiencing its sixth year of recession.
The
spending cuts and tax increases, along with the dismissal of huge numbers of
public-sector employees, demanded as a condition of the loans and assistance have
only deepened the economic pain.
Instead of
changing course, however, euro-area economists have responded to bad news by
revising their forecasts to reflect lower expectations. Those numbers document
a staggering record of mistaken assumptions that has led to today’s failure.
Shifting
Forecasts
In December
2010, the so-called troika of lenders -- the European Commission, the European
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund -- predicted that their
measures would move Greece ’s
unemployment rate to just under 15 percent by 2014. A year later, it changed
the forecast to almost 20 percent.
This month,
the Hellenic Statistical Authority reported that unemployment rose to a record
in May, with a seasonally adjusted jobless rate of 27.6 percent. The rate was
64.9 percent for people 15 to 24.
Bold
declarations that belt-tightening would produce growth have been pared back,
too. Since 2010, the troika has gradually dropped its forecast for 2014 gross
domestic product (in money terms) by almost 40 percent. IMF staff reported last
week that GDP contracted 6.4 percent in 2012 and will drop 4.2 percent this
year before expanding only a little in 2014.
Yet,
despite admissions that mistakes were certainly made, no consideration is being
given to ending austerity measures. Nor has there been effort to devise a
renewal agenda for Greece .
The Marshall Plan offers a spectacularly successful model that could easily be
adapted.
Marshall
Plan funds allowed Greece
to rebuild, start power utilities, finance businesses and aid the poor. And,
because social chaos had created an opening for communist and extremist
parties, the U.S.
hoped the stimulus would stabilize democracy, even as it created wealth.
Like other
Marshall Plan nations, Greece
experienced growth on a scale it had never known. The astonishing
transformation was widely hailed as an “economic miracle,” and the nation
continued to surge more than 20 years after the assistance ended.
With that
enormous achievement in mind, the Levy Economics Institute has constructed a
macroeconomic model of what a Marshall-type recovery plan could do for the
Greek economy today. We assumed a modest stimulus from EU institutions of 30
billion euros between 2013 and 2016 that would be directed at public
consumption and investment, and particularly jobs.
Debt
Forgiveness
Here is how
an EU-funded plan for recovery could succeed. Although past bailout funds
benefited banks and financial institutions, with a large portion devoted to
interest payments for creditors, the new program would focus on debt
forgiveness, and then turn to reconstruction projects to rebuild national
infrastructure and create public projects at the local level.
A
rebuilding plan could address Greece ’s
tremendous need to renovate schools, hospitals, libraries, parks, roads and bridges.
Forests need to be replenished: Catastrophic fires have led to deforestation.
Tourism once accounted for more than 25 percent of the economy; now,
extraordinary beach cleanups are badly needed to attract visitors.
University
graduates, after having been trained at public expense, are now forced to seek
opportunity outside Greece .
They could make valuable contributions, introducing information technology and
other know-how to the government, health and education sectors.
These
efforts could draw an idled, but ready and trained labor force, to
construction, education, social service and technology. More employment would
increase aggregate demand, which is now severely depressed. In turn, the
multiplier effect of these expenditures would increase GDP substantially.
Instead, Greece is
applying “expansive austerity.” The idea is based on a contested theory, and
the real-world results have been a humanitarian disaster. These policies are
lowering demand by reducing incomes, which cuts into tax revenue. The
inevitable result is higher deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios.
For
comparison, we modeled what we expect to happen in the coming years if Greece stays on
its scheduled fiscal diet. The government has consistently been unable to meet
troika-mandated deficit-reduction targets, and the lenders have consistently
required further cutbacks.
The results
of our modeling exercise were clear: Under today’s policies, unemployment would
continue to increase, reaching almost 34 percent by the end of 2016. Under a
Marshall Plan scenario, the rate would fall to about 20 percent.
Shrinking
GDP
Similarly,
if Greece
institutes the currently planned austerity measures, we calculate that its
gross domestic product would reach about 158 billion euros by the end of 2016,
compared with 162 billion euros projected for 2013. That would be more than 15
billion euros short of the troika-mandated target.
If,
alternatively, government squeezes harder to meet the required deficit-to-GDP
ratio goals, the endgame will be even worse: A poor and increasingly out of
work population, among other factors, will push GDP to about 148 billion euros,
more than 30 percent below its 2008 peak. A Marshall Plan scenario would put
GDP a little above the troika’s target.
The first
Marshall Plan wasn’t an act of charity or a bailout: It was an effective
investment strategy to create a vibrant European economic market and prevent
political disintegration. To institute a modern version, we need to revise
discredited austerity theories -- or the euro-area institutions that promote
them.
(Dimitri B.
Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.)
To contact
the writer of this article: Dimitri B. Papadimitriou at zklapper@Bard.edu.
To contact
the editor responsible for this article: Max Berley at mberley@bloomberg.net.
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