June 6, 2015 9:37 a.m. ET
From
MarketWatch.com
By JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ
The swing
in Greece ’s
fiscal position from a large primary deficit to a surplus was almost
unprecedented, but the demand that the country achieve a primary surplus of
4.5% of gross domestic product was unconscionable.
Unfortunately,
at the time that the “troika” — the European Commission, the European Central
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund — first included this irresponsible
demand in the international financial program for Greece , the country’s authorities
had no choice but to accede to it.
The folly
of continuing to pursue this program is particularly acute now, given the 25%
decline in GDP that Greece
has endured since the beginning of the crisis. The troika badly misjudged the
macroeconomic effects of the program that they imposed. According to their
published forecasts, they believed that, by cutting wages and accepting other
austerity measures, Greek exports would increase and the economy would quickly
return to growth. They also believed that the first debt restructuring would
lead to debt sustainability.
The
troika’s forecasts have been wrong, and repeatedly so. And not by a little, but
by an enormous amount. Greece ’s
voters were right to demand a change in course, and their government is right
to refuse to sign on to a deeply flawed program.
Having said
that, there is room for a deal: Greece
has made clear its willingness to engage in continued reforms, and has welcomed
Europe ’s help in implementing some of them. A
dose of reality on the part of Greece’s creditors — about what is achievable,
and about the macroeconomic consequences of different fiscal and structural
reforms — could provide the basis of an agreement that would be good not only
for Greece, but for all of Europe.
Some in
Europe, especially in Germany ,
seem nonchalant about a Greek exit from the eurozone. The market has, they
claim, already “priced in” such a rupture. Some even suggest that it would be
good for the monetary union.
I believe
that such views significantly underestimate both the current and future risks
involved. A similar degree of complacency was evident in the United States
before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The fragility of America ’s banks
had been known for a long time — at least since the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns the
previous March. Yet, given the lack of transparency (owing in part to weak
regulation), both markets and policy makers did not fully appreciate the
linkages among financial institutions.
Indeed, the
world’s financial system is still feeling the aftershocks of the Lehman
collapse. And banks remain non-transparent, and thus at risk. We still don’t
know the full extent of linkages among financial institutions, including those
arising from non-transparent derivatives and credit default swaps.
In Europe , we can already see some of the consequences of
inadequate regulation and the flawed design of the eurozone itself.
We know
that the structure of the eurozone encourages divergence, not convergence: as
capital and talented people leave crisis-hit economies, these countries become
less able to repay their debts. As markets grasp that a vicious downward spiral
is structurally embedded in the euro EURUSD, -1.0857% , the consequences for the next crisis become
profound. And another crisis in inevitable: it is in the very nature of
capitalism.
European
Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s confidence trick, in the form of his
declaration in 2012 that the monetary authorities would do “whatever it takes”
to preserve the euro, has worked so far. But the knowledge that the euro is not
a binding commitment among its members will make it far less likely to work the
next time. Bond yields could spike, and no amount of reassurance by the ECB and
Europe ’s leaders would suffice to bring them
down from stratospheric levels, because the world now knows that they will not
do “whatever it takes.”
As the
example of Greece
has shown, they will do only what short-sighted electoral politics demands.
The most
important consequence, I fear, is the weakening of European solidarity. The
euro was supposed to strengthen it. Instead, it has had the opposite effect.
It is not
in the interest of Europe — or the world — to have a country on Europe ’s periphery alienated from its neighbors,
especially now, when geopolitical instability is already so evident. The
neighboring Middle East is in turmoil; the West is attempting to contain a
newly aggressive Russia ; and
China ,
already the world’s largest source of savings, the largest trading country, and
the largest overall economy (in terms of purchasing power parity), is
confronting the West with new economic and strategic realities. This is no time
for European disunion.
Unfortunately,
their understanding of economics fell short of their ambition; and the politics
of the moment did not permit the creation of the institutional framework that
might have enabled the euro to work as intended. Although the single currency
was supposed to bring unprecedented prosperity, it is difficult to detect a
significant positive effect for the eurozone as a whole in the period before
the crisis. In the period since, the adverse effects have been enormous.
The future
of Europe and the euro now depends on whether
the eurozone’s political leaders can combine a modicum of economic
understanding with a visionary sense of, and concern for, European solidarity.
We are likely to begin finding out the answer to that existential question in
the next few weeks.
This
article has been published with the permission of Project Syndicate — Europe ’s Last Act?
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