China’s leader Xi Jinping declares the start of a “new era”

It sounds much like the old one—only more so

The Economist

Oct 21st 2017 | BEIJING
IN THE days before the opening on October 18th of the Chinese Communist Party’s quinquennial congress, the country’s security officials put their surveillance efforts into overdrive. On Chang’an Avenue, the boulevard that passes by the venue in Tiananmen Square, naked flames were banned. Tough luck for restaurants, family dinners and smokers. Out-of-towners driving to the capital were stopped at checkpoints and made to sign papers promising not to get into trouble during the week of the congress. Foreigners were barred from travelling to Tibet. The region is well over 1,000 miles from the capital, but the party fears that even a lone banner-waving separatist sympathiser that far away could spoil the event in Beijing.



Such paranoia reflects the importance attached by the party to such congresses. They are convened to add a veneer of intraparty democracy to decisions made beforehand in secret, but those decisions are crucial. The congress, the 19th since the party’s founding in 1921, will revise the party’s constitution, reshuffle the leadership and set the tone for policymaking in the next five years. This one matters more than most: it is the first presided over by President Xi Jinping, who is the party’s chief and will undoubtedly remain so.

The congress will consolidate Mr Xi’s already enormous power with the help of the largest turnover within the ruling elite since 1969, the height of the Cultural Revolution. About 70% of the nearly 400-strong Central Committee—the body from which the highest leaders are drawn—have reached retirement age or have been purged for corruption. “Electing” replacements (the more than 2,300 delegates at the Great Hall of the People will have few choices to play with) will result in yet more plum jobs for the party leader’s allies.

Mr Xi’s opening speech to the congress has been made out to be the product of consensus. During previous congresses, state media reported on the months-long process of drafting such documents, involving consultations with thousands of people. But this one, more than previous such speeches since Mao’s day, bore the personal stamp of the orator.

Zero hour, Xi time
Mr Xi stuck to a formulaic style, repeating oft-used phraseology. But there were significant differences, such as in the unlovely title of one section: “Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. Deng Xiaoping coined the clunky term “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in the 1980s. Mr Xi’s contribution is the catchier bit, “new era”.

China, he said, was at a “new historic juncture”. The coming era would see it “moving closer to centre stage and making greater contributions to mankind”. But achieving what he called the “Chinese dream”—another of his catchphrases—would be “no walk in the park”. He said it would “take more than drum-beating and gong-clanging to get there”.

Mr Xi talked in some detail about a “two-stage development plan” that will make China a “great modern socialist country” in the era between now and 2050. According to this, China will become a global leader in innovation by 2035, with “rule of law” in place and much greater “soft power” globally. In the 15 years after that, it will become “prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful”. (Mr Xi does not mean democratic in the normal sense: he gave no hint that there would be any erosion whatever of the party’s control.)

It is clear that Mr Xi wants to be seen as the founder of this new era. He mentioned the term 36 times in his speech. Even if it is not entirely clear what the new era will entail, the phrase has a better chance of taking off than the now largely forgotten contributions made by Mr Xi’s two immediate predecessors to the party’s ideological lexicon: the “scientific outlook on development” of Hu Jintao, and the oddly named “Three Represents” of Jiang Zemin.

Mr Xi described his new-era thoughts as “a compass for the party and people”. People’s Daily, the party’s main mouthpiece, hailed them as “the latest achievement in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context”. This implies that the term will be written into the party’s constitution during the congress. There is much speculation that Mr Xi’s name will be attached to it, making him the first leader since Deng to be named in the document.
Should the revised charter refer to “Xi Jinping Thought”, then Mr Xi will become an ideologue on a par with Mao. The party has a hierarchy of words describing systems of ideas, with “thought” (sixiang) nearly at the top, “theory” (lilun) in the middle and “view” or “perspective” (guan) at the bottom. Which word is used depends on how important the originator of the idea is considered to be. Mr Hu’s scientific development is a view. Even Deng’s Chinese characteristics are just a theory. Only Mao, so far, has achieved thought.

Messrs Hu and Jiang were sitting on either side of Mr Xi in the hall, applauding. But Mr Xi’s new-era idea clearly eclipses any musings of theirs. The words for new era, xin shidai, come first when joined together with Deng’s formulation.
Old whine in new waffle
Though Mr Xi talked about a new era, the next five years sound, from his speech, to be much like the past five—only more so. To loud applause, he declared that the momentum behind his anti-corruption campaign was unstoppable. He talked about “strengthening the party’s long-term governance capacity” (ie, involving it in more decisions) and boosting party organisations in companies, schools and villages. He stressed the need to “correct and resist various erroneous viewpoints”. It does not sound as if his persistent efforts to crush civil society will ease.

As he has done in the past, he sent mixed signals on the economy. He talked about ensuring the “market-based allocation” of resources and “business survival determined by competition”. He spoke in similar terms in 2013, a year after he came to power. This time he also promised to “support state capital in becoming stronger”, just as he has been doing since then.

Perhaps most important, he suggested there would be no let-up in his more assertive foreign policy. In his speech to the previous congress in 2012, Mr Hu had said the army’s job was “to win a local war in an information age”. Mr Xi dropped the word local. He toughened up the language on Taiwan. Where Mr Hu had talked of opposing Taiwanese independence, Mr Xi threatened to destroy it. If he is under pressure to concentrate more on domestic matters, he has resisted it in his rhetoric.

Attention now will focus on the people Mr Xi will put in place at the end of the congress to help him lead China into the new era he envisages. But whereas, after previous congresses, observers tried to work out the balance between reformers and conservatives in the new line-ups that emerged, few will be wasting much effort on such calculations this time. The central message of this event will be that Mr Xi is in absolute command; the new era will be his. That is a risky assertion in a country where many are prospering but many feel left out. In effect, Mr Xi has assumed responsibility for the way the coming era turns out.

This article appeared in the China section of the print edition under the headline "Xi’s thought, unveiled"