By HUGO DIXON | REUTERS
Published: March 24, 2013
The New
York Times
The
Cypriots always seem to overestimate their negotiating position. In recent
years, their first big mistake was to reject in 2004 the U.N. plan for uniting
their island. That irritated their E.U. partners, put Cyprus in a weak strategic position vis-à-vis Turkey and left
a jagged scar across the island.
The last
Communist government was also virtually criminal in its failure to act as the
crisis in Greece threatened
to swamp Cyprus .
If it had been willing to restructure the banks, the Cypriot economy would now
be a lot healthier. It also would have been easier to make a deal with Germany then
than now, when Angela Merkel is only months away from an election.
The new
center-right president, Nicos Anastasiades, has been in office for a month. But
he has managed to turn a crisis into a disaster by initially backing a plan to
impose a 6.75 percent tax on insured depositors.
Of course,
the other euro zone governments, the European Central Bank and the
International Monetary Fund should not have approved this terrible idea either.
And Mr. Anastasiades certainly had a gun to his head: He had to rustle up money
somehow, as the euro zone was rightly unwilling to lend Cyprus more
than €10 billion, or about $13 billion, leaving the country with a €5.8 billion
funding gap.
But the
Cypriot president is ultimately responsible for his actions. There was an
acceptable alternative: Tax the uninsured depositors at 15.5 percent and leave
the insured ones untouched.
Mr.
Anastasiades did not want to do this, as it would have angered Russia and undermined Cyprus as an offshore financial
center. But both of these have happened anyway.
When Mr.
Anastasiades found he could not sell the deposit grab to his people, he
backtracked. There was jubilation in the streets.
The Cypriot
government then asked Russia
for help. But again Nicosia
overestimated its negotiating position. Moscow
was not interested in buying bankrupt banks or lending more money. Michael
Sarris, Cyprus ’s
finance minister, was sent home empty-handed.
Meanwhile,
the E.C.B. has threatened to pull the plug on insolvent Cypriot banks unless
there is a deal with the euro zone by Monday night. As of Sunday morning, the
government was frantically trying to put together a deal focused on
restructuring its banking system and imposing capital controls.
The banking
system certainly needs a severe revamp. The second-largest lender, Laiki Bank,
is essentially bust. The largest one, Bank of Cyprus, is not in much better
shape. Controlled bankruptcy of one or both institutions would cut the amount
of capital Nicosia
has to pump into them while cauterizing the problem.
But imposing
capital controls would be a historic mistake for Cyprus and the euro zone — even
worse than the crass idea of taxing uninsured deposits. Noncash transactions
would be limited, while withdrawals from cash machines would be rationed.
This would
be equivalent to Argentina ’s
“corralito,” which lasted a year in 2001-02. If capital controls are imposed,
it will be almost impossible to lift them because people will stampede for the
exits once they are removed. But such heavy-handed rationing of limited cash
would clobber an economy that is already heading for a slump.
It would
also be a terrible precedent, probably contravening European treaties. Savers
in Italy , Spain , Greece and other vulnerable euro
zone countries might worry that they would be next and rush to remove cash from
their banking systems. Capital controls really might spell the beginning of the
end of the single currency.
Some of the
technocrats trying to save Cyprus
were belatedly waking up to such dangers over the weekend. But they were struggling
to find a viable alternative. After all, if Cypriot banks open Tuesday morning
without capital controls, there will inevitably be a run on deposits.
The
least-bad solution is for the European Central Bank to offer to supply
unlimited liquidity and finance a run. For it to do this within its rules, the
banks must be properly recapitalized and have sufficient collateral.
The key is
to separate the rotten parts of the banking system from the good ones. The
uninsured depositors can then go with the bad banks and effectively be tied up
until they are wound down. This will cut substantially the liquidity that needs
to be provided to the system. Nicosia
has effectively accepted such a solution for its second-largest bank, but was
resisting doing so for the biggest one.
Provided a
good bank/bad bank split can be agreed upon, the good banks will be in a
healthier position to get liquidity from the E.C.B. or Cyprus ’s own central bank. If they
still do not have enough suitable collateral, the E.C.B. should change the
rules to allow other types of assets to be accepted. If there is still a
shortfall, the good banks should be allowed to manufacture collateral by
issuing government-guaranteed bonds.
The Cypriot
members of Parliament will not like any of this. But what is the alternative?
Endless capital controls? Printing a parallel currency so people get Cypriot
pounds instead of euros from the cash machines? Or quitting the euro entirely?
There are
no good options. But the longer it takes for Cyprus to get real, the greater the
damage.
Hugo Dixon
is editor at large of Reuters News.
A version
of this article appeared in print on March 25, 2013, in The International
Herald Tribune.
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