Greece and geopolitics

A semi-guided missile

The Economist

America, much more than Europe, sees strategic stakes in the Aegean

Feb 28th 2015 | From the print edition

NEVER imagine that the euro zone is the only club in which Greece is a maverick player. The Hellenic relationship with NATO, and bilateral defence ties with the United States, have long been important (although many would say diminishing) and contested.

Whatever the strains, America has often put discreet pressure on its European allies to avoid a rift with Greece, as much because of geopolitics as economics. In recent days, that pressure has been felt once more. It is not just linked to the services that Greece now delivers to NATO, which are modest; it also reflects the perils that would arise if Greece cut loose from all western clubs.

In many ways, the odd thing about Greek-NATO relations is not the history of tension but the fact that they exist at all. On the Hellenic left, it is axiomatic that Greece suffers from being a pawn in western strategic games which connived at military rule from 1967 to 1974.

Greece quit NATO’s military wing for six years in 1974 after Turkey overran northern Cyprus; in 1981 leftists took power, pledging to expel American bases and ultimately take Greece out of NATO. In the 1990s Greek opinion was pro-Serbia and loathed NATO bombing that country. Study the wishlist of the ruling Syriza party today, and you will see “leaving NATO” somewhere at the end.

Yet the relationship trundles on and seems unlikely to stop. Greece hosts an air and sea facility on Crete, and American early-warning aircraft use a base near Albania. Greek ships and aircraft are listed among NATO assets, although austerity has affected their readiness. Despite Greek-Turkish rows over Aegean airspace, relations between those countries, which are both allies and historical rivals, seems just about manageable, and underpinned by strong economic ties.

Like every other small NATO member, Greece horse-trades to boost its role in the alliance structure; and as is noted by Jonathan Eyal of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London, its bargaining strength has ebbed as other southeast Europeans have joined NATO.

Quitting NATO would be a gift to regional rivals, and the new defence minister, Panos Kammenos, vows that Greece will stay for the foreseeable future. A member of a small nationalist party in coalition with Syriza, Mr Kammenos backs co-operation with America as well as Greece’s warming ties with Israel, even if he feels cultural bonds with Russia as a devout Orthodox Christian.

Such details interest an American administration which knows Greece’s new rulers less well than previous ones. (Two recent prime ministers, George Papandreou and Antonis Samaras, were room-mates in an American college.) American fear of “losing” Greece is palpable but has less to do with its military value and more to do with general fear of defences unravelling, says Wayne Merry, a fellow of the American Foreign Policy Council. Any breach in the dyke would bode ill, especially as Islamist fighters in Libya are just a speed-boat ride away.

America will also watch to see whether the sympathy some of Greece’s new rulers feel for Russia (and reluctance to impose sanctions over Ukraine) leads to real strategic change. So far it has not.