By JOSEF JOFFEJAN. 12, 2015
The New
York Times
Not even
Alexis Tsipras, the leader of the radical leftist Syriza party, wants out.
Apparently on track to win the snap elections on Jan. 25, he has vowed: “We
will stick with the euro, no doubt.”
Nor does
anybody else — including Germany
— want Greece
to leave, if truth be told, even though the German leader, Angela Merkel, now
has her minions spreading the word that a “Grexit” is no longer an absolute
no-no. If Mr. Tsipras wins and then imposes another haircut on the country’s
creditors while nixing market reforms and fiscal rigor, then it will be auf
Wiedersehen to Hellas . So goes the unspoken —
but ultimately hollow — threat from Berlin .
In the
meantime, Ms. Merkel’s spokesman has volubly denied that threats, even implicit
ones, were made. Nonetheless, the euro crisis is back to where it started five
years ago: in Greece .
Is it another rising tide that will recede, as in years past, or a deadly
tsunami that will drown first Greece
and then the eurozone?
Unless you
overbought now-melting Greek bonds, sit back and enjoy the theater with its two
starring antagonists, the chancellor of Germany
and the would-be prime minister of Greece . Ms. Merkel, as is her
habit, deploys innuendo and leaks. Mr. Tsipras flings wild-eyed threats. He
wants to “tear up” austerity pledges and stop servicing Greek debt, invoking
the metaphor of the Cold War’s nuclear standoffs: “If one side pushes the red
button, then all will lose.”
This is the
core of the crisis: a monetary game of chicken. As we know from war gaming, the
party that appears to be crazier than the rest tends to score. Strategists call
this the “rationality of irrationality.” Foam at the mouth, and you’ll get your
way more easily than meekly asking for another 100 billion euros.
Crazy the
game is not. The Greeks have been saved twice: in 2010, with 110 billion euros
($147 billion), and in 2012, with 130 billion euros ($173 billion). In 2011,
private investors had to take a 50 percent write-down on their holdings of
Greek government debt. These bailouts have created their own expectations in Greece .
Monetary
war is a bit like nuclear war in this respect: Everyone knows how to start one,
but nobody knows how it will end. A Grexit might get rid of a noisome neighbor,
but it might also bring down the whole house of the euro.
In their
more sober moments, Greek politicians might play a friendlier game. They could
trot out what they have already achieved. Growth, which just three years ago
was in negative territory, with the Greek economy shrinking about 7 percent a
year, is now not much worse than Germany’s. Unemployment — still a whopping 25
percent — is falling, though ever so slightly.
Unfortunately,
there is a darker side. Austerity measures inflicted by the eurozone and the
International Monetary Fund have not been quite as cruel as Athens keeps claiming. The debt of Greece ’s
central government has almost doubled since 2011, and gross external debt has
since risen from 370 billion euros to 412 billion over the same period. So Greece is still
living beyond its means.
Hence
crisis No.3. Athens ’s
exposure to foreign lenders is rising once more. In everyday language, the
Greeks cannot get their act together. Worse, if Mr. Tsipras does win a
parliamentary majority at the end of the month, he has pledged to unleash a
wave of public spending to reward his supporters.
Strangely,
this gambit is not irrational brinkmanship. If Syriza does come to power (though
at the moment its lead is shrinking), the new government will yield here and
there to make nice with Ms. Merkel. But any government, left-wing or centrist,
knows one big thing: Greece
has a history of bailouts on its side. That will dampen the passions of ardent
reformists.
By
contrast, the German leader does not have Europe
on her side. France and Italy , just to
name the big two, have been trying to get out from under the chancellor’s whip
for years. Unable, like Greece ,
to bring forward labor market reforms and economic liberalization, Paris and Rome
are clamoring for an end to fiscal discipline, which would allow them to
allocate their (or their creditors’) money to lavish deficit spending. The
Mediterranean mood is working for Athens .
Also, with
its tiny economy, Greece
can and will be saved, again. It is too small to fail, so to speak. But
together, France and Italy represent Europe ’s
hard-core problem, which is economic stagnation over time — despite a long
history of deficit spending.
Forget the Grexit
issue: It’s Europe ’s historical trends that
should worry us. In the decades since the economic miracle days of the ’70s,
real growth in the European Union has dropped on average by three-quarters of a
percentage point. Productivity growth has likewise slid, to 0.4 percent from
about 2 percent per year. These ailments are deeply embedded in economies that
lag behind on investment, innovation and competitiveness.
Josef
Joffe, a fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and
the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford, is the editor of the German newspaper
Die Zeit.
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