The Washington Post
By Lawrence Summers,
Published: January 6
Lawrence
Summers is a professor and past president at Harvard. He was Treasury secretary
from 1999 to 2001 and economic adviser to President Obama from 2009 through
2010.
Last month
I argued that the U.S.
and global economies may be in a period of secular stagnation in which sluggish
growth and output, and employment levels well below potential, might coincide
for some time to come with problematically low real interest rates. Since the
start of this century, annual growth in U.S. gross domestic product has
averaged less than 1.8 percent. The economy is now operating nearly 10 percent,
or more than $1.6 trillion, below what the Congressional Budget Office judged to
be its potential path as recently as 2007. And all this is in the face of
negative real interest rates for more than five years and extraordinarily easy
monetary policies.
Even some
forecasters who have had the wisdom to remain pessimistic about growth
prospects the past few years are coming around to more optimistic views of
2014, at least in the United
States . This is encouraging but should be
qualified with the recognition that even on optimistic forecasts, output and
employment stand to remain well below previous trends for many years. More
troubling, even with the high degree of slack in the economy and with wage and
price inflation slowing, there are signs of eroding credit standards and
inflated asset values. If the United
States were to enjoy several years of
healthy growth under anything like current credit conditions, there is every
reason to expect a return to the kind of problems of bubbles and excess lending
seen in 2005 to 2007 long before output and employment returned to normal trend
growth or inflation picked up again.
The
challenge of secular stagnation, then, is not just to achieve reasonable growth
but to do so in a financially sustainable way. There are, essentially, three
approaches. The first would emphasize what is seen as the economy’s deep
supply-side fundamentals: the skills of the workforce, companies’ capacity for
innovation, structural tax reform and ensuring the sustainability of
entitlement programs. This is appealing, if politically difficult, and would
make a great contribution to the country’s long-term economic health. But this
approach is unlikely to do much in the next five to 10 years. Apart from
obvious lags like those in education, our economy is held back by lack of
demand rather than lack of supply. Increasing capacity to produce will not
translate into increased output unless there is more demand for goods and
services. Training programs or reform of social insurance may, for instance,
affect which workers get jobs, but such efforts would not affect how many get jobs.
Indeed, measures that raise supply could have the perverse effect of magnifying
deflationary pressures.
The second
strategy, which has dominated U.S.
policy in recent years, is lowering relevant interest rates and capital costs
as much as possible and relying on regulatory policies to ensure financial
stability. No doubt the economy is far healthier now than it would have been in
the absence of these measures. But a growth strategy that relies on interest
rates significantly below growth rates for long periods virtually ensures the
emergence of substantial financial bubbles and dangerous buildups in leverage.
The idea that regulation can allow the growth benefits of easy credit to come
without cost is a chimera. The increases in asset values and increased ability
to borrow that stimulate the economy are the proper concern of prudent
regulation.
The third
approach — and the one that holds the most promise — is a commitment to raising
the level of demand at any given level of interest rates through policies that
restore a situation where reasonable growth and reasonable interest rates can
coincide. To start, this means ending the disastrous trends toward ever less
government spending and employment each year and taking advantage of the
current period of economic slack to renew and build out our infrastructure. If
the federal government had invested more over the past five years, the U.S. debt
burden relative to income would be lower: allowing slackening in the economy
has hurt its long-run potential.
Raising
demand also means spurring private spending. Much could be done in the energy
sector to unleash private investment toward fossil fuels and renewables.
Regulation that requires more rapid replacement of coal-fired power plants
would increase investment and push growth as well as help the environment. And
it is essential in a troubled global economy to make sure that a widening trade
deficit does not excessively divert demand from the U.S. economy.
Secular
stagnation is not inevitable. With the right policy choices, the United States
can have both reasonable growth and financial stability. But without a clear
diagnosis of our problem and a commitment to structural increases in demand, we
will be condemned to oscillating between inadequate growth and unsustainable
finance. We can do better.
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