158 JUL 1, 2015 12:01 AM EDT
By Clive Crook
Bloomberg
In my more
than 30 years writing about politics and economics, I have never before
witnessed such an episode of sustained, self-righteous, ruinous and dissembling
incompetence -- and I'm not talking about Alexis Tsipras and Syriza. As the
damage mounts, the effort to rewrite the history of the European Union's abject
failure over Greece
is already underway. Pending a fuller postmortem, a little clarity on the
immediate issues is in order.
On Monday,
European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said at a news conference
that he'd been betrayed by the Greek government.
The
creditor institutions, he said, had shown flexibility and sought compromise.
Their most recent offer involved no wage cuts, he emphasized, and no pension
cuts; it was a package that created "more social fairness." Tsipras
had misled Greeks about what the creditors were asking. The talks were getting
somewhere. Agreement on this package could have been reached "easily"
if Tsipras hadn't collapsed the process early Saturday by calling a referendum.
What an
outrageous passel of distortion. Since these talks began five months ago, both
sides have budged, but Tsipras has given vastly more ground than the creditors.
In particular, he was ready to accede to more fiscal austerity -- a huge
climbdown on his part. True, the last offer requires a slightly milder profile
of primary budget surpluses than the creditors initially demanded; nonetheless,
it still calls for severely (and irrationally) tight fiscal policy.
In
contrast, the creditors have refused to climb down on the question of including
debt relief in the current talks, absurdly insisting that this is an issue for
later. On Tuesday, Tsipras made his most desperate attempt yet to bring the
issue forward.
Far from
expressing any desire to compromise, dominant voices among the creditors --
notably German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, who often seemed to be
calling the shots -- have maintained throughout that there is nothing to
discuss. The program already in place had to be completed, and that was that.
Yes, the
program had failed. No, it wouldn't achieve debt sustainability. Absolutely, it
was pointlessly grinding down Greek living standards even further. What did
that have to do with it?
Juncker
says the last offer made no demand for wage cuts. Really? The offer says the
"wage grid" should be modernized, including "decompressing the
[public sector] wage distribution." On the face of it, decompressing
involves cuts. If the creditors were calling for public-sector wages to be
decompressed upward perhaps they should have made this clear. Regardless, the
increases in value-added taxes demanded by the creditors mean lower real wages,
public and private alike. As for no pension cuts, the creditors called for
phasing out new early-retirement penalties and the so-called social solidarity
payment for the poorest pensioners. Those are cuts.
The
creditors called for a lot else, too. Remember that the Greek economy is on its
knees. Living standards have collapsed and the unemployment rate is 25 percent.
Now read the offer document, and see if you think the advance in "social
fairness" that Juncker stressed at his news conference shines through.
But I
haven’t mentioned the biggest distortion of all. Noticing for the first time
that Greece
has EU citizens within its borders, Juncker addressed them directly on the
subject of the July 5 referendum. Greeks will be asked whether they accept the
offer presented by the creditors -- an offer, by the way, that the creditors
say no longer stands. "No [to the offer that no longer exists] would mean
that Greece is saying no to Europe ," Juncker explained. President Francois
Hollande of France
clarified: The vote would determine "whether the Greeks want to stay in
the euro zone."
Nonsense.
There's no doubt that Greeks want to stay in the euro system -- though I find
it increasingly difficult to see why. If Greece
leaves the system, it won't be because Greeks decide to leave; it will be
because Europe decides to kick them out.
This isn't
just semantics. There's no reason, in law or logic, why a Greek default
necessitates an exit from the euro. The European Central Bank pulls this
trigger by choosing -- choosing, please note -- to withhold its services as
lender of last resort to the Greek banking system. That is what it did this
week. That is what shut the banks and, in short order, will force the Greek
authorities to start issuing a parallel currency in the form of IOUs.
A truly
independent ECB, willing to do whatever it takes to defend the euro system,
could have announced that it would keep supplying Greek banks with liquidity.
If the Greek banks are deemed in due course to be insolvent (which hasn’t
happened yet), that doesn't have to trigger an exit, either. Europe
has the wherewithal and a bank-rescue mechanism that would allow the banks to
be taken over and recapitalized. These options are foreclosed because the
supposedly apolitical ECB has let Europe's finance ministers use it as a hammer
to extract fiscal concessions from Greece .
Nobody ever
imagined that a government default in Europe
would dictate ejection from the euro zone. The very possibility would have been
correctly recognized as a fatal defect in the design of the system.
If the
Greeks vote no, a Greek exit is a possible and even likely consequence. But if
it happens, the reason won't be that Greece chose to go. The reason will
be that the European Union and its politicized central bank chose to inflict
exit as punishment.
To contact
the author on this story:
Clive Crook
at ccrook5@bloomberg.net
To contact
the editor on this story:
James
Gibney at jgibney5@bloomberg.net
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