MARCH 13,
2015
The New
Yorker
BY JOHN
CASSIDY
ew weeks
ago, I wrote a post saying that big European countries had outmaneuvered Greece
in negotiations to extend the country’s financial bailout, resulting in an
interim deal, which was signed on February 20th, in Brussels. In a rebuttal at
Social Europe, the economist James K. Galbraith, a supporter of Greece ’s leftist Syriza government and a former
colleague of Yanis Varoufakis , Greece ’s finance minister, took me to task,
saying that Greece
had received what it needed: some fiscal space and a guarantee of financial
stability. In the Times, Paul Krugman also argued that the Greeks had done
pretty well in the deal.
At the
time, I didn’t respond. That was partly because I respect Galbraith and
Krugman, and partly because I was hoping that they might be proved right. It
was possible that I had underplayed a clause in the February 20th agreement
which specified that Greece ’s
deficit target for this year would be set after taking account of current
economic conditions, implying that the previous, patently unrealistic target
had been dropped. Perhaps this really would enable Syriza to get on with the
urgent task of providing some relief to Greece ’s stricken economy and
moving beyond austerity.
So far,
however, things haven’t turned out that way. Far from enjoying some fiscal
space, the Greek government has spent much of the past few weeks watching its
money run out and struggling to make payments on loans that have come due.
Despite the Brussels agreement, Greece hasn’t received any disbursements from
the E.U., and it won’t receive any until Syriza can persuade the European
Commission, the European Central Bank (E.C.B.), and the International Monetary
Fund—the “troika” of financial institutions that has long overseen the Greek
bailout—that its economic-reform program meets their specifications. In the
meantime, Athens
is dependent on the E.C.B alone for financing, and the bank is doling out
credit very stringently—in the words of Varoufakis, it is “asphyxiating” the
Greek government.
This isn’t
happening by accident.
The
February agreement was not designed to give the Greek government financial
breathing room but to pressure it into acceding to the wishes of its creditors.
Syriza’s negotiators did win a relaxation (albeit an unspecified one) of its
deficit target for this year. But to Germany and other big European countries,
the two key aspects of the deal were that the Greek government agreed to submit
a reform plan to the troika (now renamed “the institutions”) for approval, and
that Greece would not receive any money right away—thus leaving it hostage to
the E.C.B, which is a creature of the European establishment.
With this
deal in place, the E.U. is trying to squeeze the Greek government into
submission. The country’s tax revenues are declining, and it is facing a
funding crisis. How acute is this crisis? “In the space of the past week it has
raised six-month T-bills, tapped into the bank deposits of pensions and public
sector salaries, postponed government payments for supplies to the public and
private sector, and approached the Greek subsidiaries of multi-national
companies for short-term loans,” the Guardian’s Helena Smith reported from
Athens on Thursday.
The Greek
banking system, which in normal times could help to fund the government,
suffered a rash of withdrawals in the weeks after Syriza’s election, in late
January, and it is still dependent on outside support. On Thursday, the E.C.B,
which is providing loans to Greek financial institutions solely through its
Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility, said it would raise the borrowing
ceiling for Greek banks by six hundred million euros. But this is only a
short-term measure. If current trends continue, financial analysts say, the
banks will need more credit in another week or two.
At a press
conference in Paris
on Thursday, the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras publicly acknowledged that
the February agreement had left him and his colleagues in a bind. “One of the
gaps was there was no clear reference to the issue of financing,” he said.
Asked what he was going to do next, given that Greece ’s creditors were “tightening
the noose,” he replied, with a wry smile, “I do not feel as if I have a noose
around my neck. I feel that Greece
is determined to move forward along the reform process. Our partners need to
understand they need to help and assist us, and leave the past as a bad
memory.”
This talk
of leaving the past behind sounded a bit rich, coming from someone who told
Greece’s parliament, two days before, that the country had a “moral obligation”
to seek reparations from Germany for its actions during the Second World War,
thereby raising the possibility that the Greek government might seize some
German-owned assets. Tsipras is in a tough spot, though. Some Syriza members
are accusing him of capitulating to the E.U., and it is not so surprising that
he has chosen to take a few shots at the Germans, whom many Greeks hold
responsible for their current woes. And he made a very good point, in Paris , about the need for Greece ’s E.U. partners to help his
country out.
Forget, for
a moment, the increasingly bitter daily back-and-forth. Since Syriza was
elected, on a platform of ending austerity and throwing out the troika, it has
said that it will run a primary surplus this year and will submit an
economic-reform proposal to the troika—a proposal that is said to include
anti-corruption measures, a clampdown on tax evasion, and moves to break up
monopolies, all policies that would appeal to the E.C.B. and the I.M.F. Syriza
also wants to do some things the troika might not like, such as stopping
mortgage foreclosures and raising wages. Over all, though, the party has moved
in the direction that the E.U. wants—too far, even, for some of its own
members.
In this
context, Syriza surely deserves some financial leeway to present its reform
proposal and introduce some of the humanitarian measures it has promised to
Greeks, such as providing free food and heating to the very poor. In backing
off a bit now, the E.U. wouldn’t be giving up much. If, by the end of April,
which is the agreed-upon deadline for the troika to review Syriza’s reform
program, the proposals still aren’t satisfactory to the E.U., it will have the
option to deny Greece
more money and let the country fend for itself. But squeezing the Greek
government now, when it remains committed to the agreement reached in Brussels —Tsipras
reiterated this commitment on Thursday—is unconscionable.
The E.U.
claims that it is merely sticking by its rule book for negotiating (or
renegotiating) bailouts. But, as the Greek economic commentator Nick Malkoutzis
pointed out earlier this week, it almost seems as though some prominent E.U.
leaders are determined to exact retribution for uppity behavior by Tsipras and,
especially, Varoufakis. “The solution here does not lie just in the Greek side
getting a crash course in European diplomacy and being more circumspect in what
it says,” Malkoutzis wrote. “It also requires true Europeans on the other side
to quash any feelings of punishment or prejudice that are stirring within the
corridors of power in Brussels
and other European capitals.”
Amen to
that. In Brussels on Wednesday, a team from Greece met with
representatives of the troika to start going over the Greek proposals in
detail. It’s too early to predict how these talks will turn out. But for Syriza
to be able to sell an agreement to the Greek public, it will need to show that
the negotiations have been carried out in good faith, and that a significant
break with the past has taken place. If the E.U. is seen to be bullying the
Greek government into capitulating, it will spark a public backlash that is
likely to end with Greece
leaving the euro zone.
Personally,
I’m not entirely convinced that that would be the worst outcome for Greece . (James
Surowiecki considered some of the potential benefits of such a move in a recent
column.) But it’s not an outcome that any of the parties involved claim to
want. If they mean what they say, it’s time for a change of tack, and for a
display of statesmanship.
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-e-u-is-trying-to-squeeze-greece-into-submission
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