April 15th,
2014
02:31 PM ET
By
Christopher S. Chivvis and Bonny Lin, Special to CNN
CNN
(Editor's
note: Christopher S. Chivvis is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit,
nonpartisan RAND Corporation and expert in European and Eurasian security
issues. You can follow him @cchivvis. Bonny Lin is an associate political
scientist at RAND and an expert on Asia-Pacific security issues. The views
expressed are their own.)
At Sunday
night's emergency U.N. Security Council meeting, Western countries denounced
Russian efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine . Depending on your reading
of its statement, China
either refused to do the same, or refused to back Russia . Either way, the meeting was
just the latest example of how the Ukraine
crisis has put China
in a bind.
To be sure,
it will be hard for China to
take a tough position against Russia
for several reasons. Geopolitically, China
shares a long border with Russia ,
which it views as a key trading and strategic partner. President Xi Jinping's
first foreign visit as head of state was to Russia and Xi made developing
closer relations with Russia a foreign policy priority. In the event of a
U.S.-China confrontation, Beijing would likely
hope to be able to rely on Moscow
for neutrality, and, if necessary, a supply of energy and other war essential
resources.
Still, China is very unlikely to come down
unequivocally in Russia 's
camp on Ukraine .
Why? To
begin with, Russia 's use of
a referendum to break Crimea away from Ukraine contradicts one of the core
tenets of Chinese foreign policy: mutual respect for territorial integrity and
sovereignty and non-aggression and non-interference in another country's
internal affairs. China
does not support referendums or attempts by domestic groups to seek
independence. Similarly, China
has never annexed an undisputed territory of a neighboring country in order to
protect the territory's ethnic Chinese majority.
On the
surface, one might expect China
to support Russia 's
annexation of Crimea in order to bolster its own claims to Taiwan and
disputed territories. But Russia 's
relationship to Crimea is fundamentally different than any of China 's
disputed claims. On Taiwan ,
not only is the military challenge radically different, but Taiwan is an island that China claims
authority over, not part of another state.
More
fundamentally, the Crimea referendum could be viewed as a protest against the
established order and Beijing
may well worry that Russian actions will encourage challenges to the Chinese
Communist Party's authority at home. Beijing may
also be wary that the Crimea or any future referendums in Ukraine could be used as a precedent for similar
votes in Taiwan , Xinjiang,
and Tibet – any of which
would amount to a crisis for Beijing .
In other words, China likely
sees the Crimea referendum more from the perspective of Kiev
than Moscow .
Similarly,
while some hawkish Chinese netizens may laud Russian President Vladimir Putin
for taking a tough stand against the imperialist West, the Chinese leadership
is likely to view Russia 's
policy as overly aggressive. Chinese military strategists have prided
themselves on never occupying foreign territory or invading other countries for
purposes other than self-defense. China opposes countries that
attempt to use force or intimidation to challenge the sovereignty of other
independent states. Importantly, China
did not support Russia in
its invasion of Georgia
in 2008.
All this
suggests that Russia 's claim
that it will seek a closer relationship with China
in the event the West isolates it is likely to continue to meet with a very
cautious response from Beijing .
As much as China may wish to lean on Russia should Beijing find itself at odds
with the United States, Xi seeks a new type of great power relationship with
the United States that calls for mutual respect, no confrontation, and
cooperation. China wants – and
some even argue needs – to have good relations with the United States
and the international community as it continues to grow. The United
States and the European Union are also China 's largest
trade partners. An embrace of Russia
at this time could cost China
much global goodwill.
Finally, China does have a relationship with Ukraine that is
not irrelevant. It had strong ties on trade, agricultural partnerships, and the
military, and will want to see those ties endure under the new Ukrainian
government. Xi has also made combating corruption a key domestic agenda. Given
that cronyism was a key factor in Yanukovych's demise, it would not be easy for
Xi to appear to side with him without negative domestic blowback.
If China hesitates to tilt toward Russia on Crimea ,
this will not, of course, be a sign that it is ready to join the West in a full
condemnation of Russian policy, much less support harsh sanctions or military
measures. Even if Russia invades Ukraine
proper, Beijing may hesitate to publicly denounce
Russia
and prefer to sit on the sidelines, as it did in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.
Chinese strategists will question whether Beijing
has the leverage needed to convince Putin to change course. In general, China has
little appetite for entanglement in conflict far from its borders, especially
given multiple challenges in its own neighborhood.
The Chinese
view of the crisis does suggest, however, that China 's growing role in the world,
grounded in globalization, will encourage it to avoid playing a destabilizing
role as the crisis evolves. A refusal by China
to back Russia on Crimea may
not be a de facto backing of the U.S.
position, but it might help discourage Russia from further aggression.
Post by:
CNN's Jason
Miks
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