There’s
something wrong with Europe . No one can
agree what
May 17th 2014
The
Economist
IS THE euro
crisis over? To judge from how often the words appear in global media (down by
three-quarters between early 2012 and early 2014), the answer is yes. Markets
have calmed since July 2012, when the president of the European Central Bank
(ECB), Mario Draghi, promised to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. Ireland and now Portugal are climbing out of their
bail-out programmes. Even Greece ,
where the crisis began, has just sold debt.
Yet, as
these books all argue, the crisis was always about more than whether financial
markets would buy government debt. It raised broad worries over how countries
with widely differing levels of prosperity, competitiveness, public spending
and taxes, and regulation of labour and product markets, could share a currency
without economic shocks blowing them apart. And it was about whether euro-zone
voters would accept low growth, high unemployment and a permanent loss of
sovereignty to the centre. None of these concerns has been fully dealt with.
Jean
Pisani-Ferry, who now works in the French prime minister’s office, was director
of Bruegel, an influential Brussels
think-tank during the crisis. His careful and persuasive book is an extensive
updating of an essay published in French in 2011. And, although he is a
supporter of the euro and of European integration, he describes thoroughly the
hugely expensive mistakes made by Europe ’s
leaders.
The biggest
error was to misunderstand the underlying causes of the crisis. Because the
first victim was Greece , it
became accepted wisdom in Brussels (and Berlin ) that the problem
was profligate spending and borrowing. The Germans liked this explanation
because it confirmed the suspicions they had before the creation of the euro
that they might be lumbered with other countries’ debts. It also looked
susceptible to a gratifyingly simple cure: ever more fiscal austerity. And it
avoided any suggestion that Germany
might have contributed to the crisis by running a large current-account surplus
that its banks recycled in cheap loans to Mediterranean property developers.
Mr
Pisani-Ferry offers a challenging alternative hypothesis. Suppose that the
crisis had begun, as it might easily have done, in Ireland ? It would then have been
obvious that fiscal irresponsibility was not the culprit: Ireland had a
budget surplus and very low debt. More to blame were economic imbalances,
inflated property prices and dodgy bank loans. The priority should not have
been tax rises and spending cuts, but reforms to improve competitiveness and a
swift resolution of troubled banks, including German and French ones, that lent
so irresponsibly.
Philippe
Legrain, who once worked for The Economist, was another close observer of the
euro crisis, as an economic adviser to the European Commission president, José
Manuel Barroso. His conclusions are similar to Mr Pisani-Ferry’s, if more
stridently expressed. He is particularly good on (and particularly scathing about)
the shortcomings of his own institution and the ECB. He is not popular in Brussels or Frankfurt .
Mr Legrain
argues that Europe should have tackled its
banks’ problems much sooner than mid-2012, when it decided to create a (still
incomplete) banking union. A big reason why America
has recently grown faster than Europe is that
it did more to sort out its banks in 2008-09. Mr Legrain is also right to
criticise the ECB for its half-hearted bond purchases before July 2012, when it
finally emerged as a proper lender of last resort. Only in the second part of
his book, when he moves into broader topics such as education, innovation,
climate change and democracy, culminating in his call for a “European spring”,
are his arguments sometimes less persuasive.
Both authors
agree that the aftermath of the crisis is an unsatisfactory one that may not
endure. Even if markets do not turn sour again, most of Europe
seems stuck with low growth, high unemployment (especially for young people)
and a horrible debt burden. The risk of a “lost decade” similar to Japan ’s in the
1990s is worryingly high. Worst of all is the broad disillusion of voters with
the entire European project, which will be expressed in this month’s European
elections through big gains for populist and extremist parties.
Roger
Bootle has similarly gloomy concerns about the state of the European project,
but his conclusions strike a far more Euro-sceptical tone. He wants to reduce
the role of Brussels and enhance that of
governments, with a call to “renationalise Europe ”.
He also believes that Britain, where David Cameron is threatening to hold an
in/out referendum by 2017, is well-placed to push an agenda of reforms that
turns the European project into little more than a somewhat expanded free-trade
area—and that, if he does not succeed, Britain should leave the club.
What is
striking is how much the authors agree about the failings of the EU and the
euro, which is stuck in a half-completed house. Where they differ is in the
solutions they propose. Europhiles want deeper integration and more centralised
powers. That was proposed this spring by the German-led Glienicker group and by
the French-led Eiffel Europe group. It is also backed by Loukas Tsoukalis, a
Greek academic, in an essay, “The Unhappy State of the Union”, published by
London-based Policy Network.
Yet few
voters feel warmly about ever closer union; many would agree with Mr Bootle
that this aspiration of the original Treaty of Rome should be formally ditched.
Nor do many welcome ever greater intrusion by Brussels
and Frankfurt into domestic politics. A more
plausible idea, backed by Mr Legrain, is to restore greater freedom to national
governments but reinstate the principle that they will not be rescued by the
centre if they get into trouble.
The biggest
worry may stem from the perception that the crisis is over. This is likely to
slow or even stop further reforms. If that happens, the EU and the euro will
get into trouble again—and the outcome next time could be even worse.
From the
print edition: Books and arts
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