It is not a good idea for Greece to leave the euro. But it is
time to prepare for its departure
May 19th 2012 | from the print edition
The Economist
“GREXIT” is an ugly term for what may soon become an even
uglier reality: Greece ’s
departure from the euro zone. As fury in Athens
runs up against frustration with Greek recalcitrance in the rest of the
European Union, the
EU’s most troubled economy could be heading out of the
single currency within weeks. If Greek banks suffer a mass run, as depositors
withdraw euros for fear they will be forcibly converted into new drachmas,
There is already a whiff of inevitability about an outcome
once deemed impossible. Central bankers now openly discuss the possibility that
Greece
may leave. As the impossible lapses into the inevitable, a growing chorus is
arguing that it is even desirable. Advocates of an exit say that Greece would
gain from a cheaper currency, and that the politics of forging a closer fiscal
and financial union between the euro zone’s remaining members would be easier
without a country that should never have joined in the first place. But it is
wrong to pretend that a Greek exit is an easy or desirable outcome. Before it
is too late, Greek politicians need to be honest about what an exit implies.
And Europe ’s politicians need to act far more
boldly to protect the rest of the euro zone in case the worst happens.
Eirexit, Porxit, Spaxit and Ixit
Start with the Greeks. Most of them want to ditch the hated
austerity policies that they blame for their plight. Mr Tsipras and his
colleagues are fuelling the belief that Greece can somehow avoid austerity
and still stay in the euro. In fact Greeks cannot avoid austerity, either
within the euro or outside it.
It is true that Greece can survive within the euro
only with a gruelling downward adjustment of wages and prices, which demands
painful budget cuts and structural reforms. Yet even stronger medicine would be
required if Greece
left the euro. Cut off from foreign funds, the country would be forced into
still tighter fiscal austerity. It would need a disciplined monetary policy and
bold structural reforms to retain the gains from its cheaper currency and avoid
hyperinflation. Discipline and reform are not familiar concepts in Greek
politics.
Moreover a chaotic Greek departure would devastate the
country’s political life, because Greece would risk expulsion from
the single market and perhaps even the EU itself. A place that shed
dictatorship as recently as 1974 would find exclusion from Europe
traumatic. For a taste of what might ensue you only need to look at the rising
power of extremists such as the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party.
If Greek voters deserve greater honesty about the Grexit, so
do those in the rest of the euro zone. Greece may be a small economy, but
a Greek departure from the euro, amid brinkmanship and bluster, would not be a
small event. Most obviously, exit—and the subsequent default on its private as
well as official debt—would cost European banks, firms and taxpayers a lot of
money (see article). And that is without counting the danger of a general
contagion in weak euro-zone economies.
There is no formal mechanism for leaving the single
currency. As depositors and bondholders across the euro zone factor in the
increased risk that their assets could also fall victim to a break-up, other
countries would come under pressure. Today’s much-ballyhooed “firewall” is not
nearly strong enough.
People strive to avoid disaster. Yet the scope for political
miscalculation and financial panic means that the worst might still happen—it
may even come soon. Deposits are fleeing Greek banks at an accelerating pace.
If financial panic forced a Greek exit before the vote, it would wreck the
credibility of pledges that banks across the euro zone are safe. As the Greek
economy shrinks within the euro, the economic arguments will become finely
balanced—because capital will have fled and the debt burden loom larger. As Greece ’s
politics is bankrupted, the siren call of populism may grow irresistible.
These dangers require urgent action. First, to prevent a
mass run, the European Central Bank must be ready to flood the Greek banks with
liquidity—raising the losses to European taxpayers if Greece does
eventually leave. And second, to stop a Greek exit being followed by a
cascading loss of confidence in other peripheral economies, the euro zone must
undergo much faster acceleration towards fiscal and financial integration than
most European politicians will admit.
To safeguard banks in Portugal
or Spain
from runs, European policymakers will have to set up some form of euro-wide
deposit insurance. And to reassure investors in the sovereign-debt markets,
there will have to be much quicker progress to some form of debt mutualisation
among the single currency’s members. The Europeans should have started work on
these things during the lull in the crisis earlier this year. Germany
resisted that. Now these changes must be done in a rush.
A vote to rock democracy’s cradle
The Greek election is in effect a referendum on whether the
country will stay in the euro. It is not completely without hope. A new Greek
coalition which vowed to stick to the rescue deal would in fact gain some help
from the rest of Europe . At the same time,
with the promise of a common banking backstop and some form of Eurobonds, the
euro would at last start to look as if it could survive and the dangers of
contagion would fall away. And if Greece were an isolated problem, it
would be much easier to nurse slowly back to health.
The financial re-engineering of Europe
is a prerequisite for the euro to survive. Greece is bringing forward that
moment of truth. And yet politicians, particularly in Germany , have
still to accept the logic, let alone explain it to voters. The prospect of a
Greek exit means they must begin to do so—and fast.
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