The Wall
Street Journal
JANUARY 16,
2012, 5:22 AM
… news from Athens that the debt-restructuring talks
there have been suspended should really be of bigger concern…
… Greece has a €14.4 billion bond
maturing on March 20 that it can’t afford to pay in full,…
… We’ll go through those steps one by one…
… It first has to come to an agreement with its
private-sector creditors…
… For the deal to be consummated, Greece ’s
not-too-happy euro-zone peers have to sign off on sending some €60 billion its
way…
… it will need €30 billion to recapitalize
its own banks… and another €30 billion to give to the wounded bondholders as an
upfront cash sweetener…
The latest
from the Greek capital Monday was that talks would resume with a view to having
a deal in place by Feb. 23, when euro-zone finance ministers will be meeting.
Here’s why
it’s crucial that the deal is done as soon as possible, and why the schedule of
46 working days –including today- that Greece , the private sector, the
euro zone and the International Monetary Fund have to complete it is very tight
indeed.
We’ll go through those steps one by one, but before we do, it should be
clear that if Greece
doesn’t manage to complete the restructuring by March 20, it will go into a
hard default. While the market has largely priced in this eventuality, the
fulfillment of the scenario is ultimately unpredictable.
It first has to come to an agreement with its
private-sector creditors. These talks have just been suspended and are said to resume next
Wednesday.
If it
doesn’t get high enough participation, Greece will likely force the rest
of the creditors into the deal–making it an involuntary restructuring that most
likely will trigger credit-default swap contracts.
In order to
have the involuntary path available to it, Greece also needs to pass a law
through parliament that will retrofit its bonds with collective-action clauses.
Then the
bondholders have to reflect on the deal for a while before formally accepting
it–or indeed rejecting it.
In the
eventuality of a forced restructuring, the country would have to physically
hold a vote among creditors to ensure that a majority is on board, thus making
use of the CACs to bind in the minority opposing the deal.
This is the
stage where some creditors are likely to begin litigation processes against the
country on various grounds.
Assuming
all has gone smoothly thus far–or even that the CACs have been used and the
minority bondholders have been forced in–the deal has to be consummated, i.e.,
bondholders must give Greece their old bonds and get new ones.
For the deal to be consummated, Greece ’s
not-too-happy euro-zone peers have to sign off on sending some €60 billion its
way. Why? Because it will need €30 billion to recapitalize
its own banks that will face collapse after they take the losses in their
holdings of Greek debt and another €30
billion to give to the wounded bondholders as an upfront cash sweetener.
We are told
the euro-zone countries will discuss these rather large disbursements at their
Jan. 30 summit.
So after
the euro-zone countries have signed off on the funds and Greece has
actually received them, the bond exchange can go forward.
It’s
difficult to estimate how long each of the above steps will take but it’s clear
that there are several things that could go wrong between today and March 19.
It should be noted that the completion of the
Greek debt restructuring within the next 46 working days by no means implies
that Greece
is rescued, or that
its debt is on a trajectory towards becoming sustainable. It merely means that
the imminent threat of hard default is averted.
A final
note: because Greece ’s bonds
don’t have so-called cross-default clauses written in them, if Greece were
unable to repay its March 20 maturity, it would go into a form of a
“mini-default”–at least technically speaking. The event, however, would still
trigger CDS contracts on some chunks of debt. It would illustrate the almost
untenable position Greece
is in and would spook the market as a preview of what a Greek disaster might
look like. It would also likely make the rest of the vulnerable euro-zone bond
markets jittery and could cost a Greek bank or two its viability.
Follow @MatinaStevis on Twitter
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