Bloomberg
editorial view
… because the immediate costs of an exit
would be enormous…
… resurrecting national currencies and
regaining control of monetary policy would create as many problems as they
solved….
… chronic trade deficits, which must be
financed through continued borrowing…
… leaving the euro would be an even bigger
economic disaster…
… the new drachma would instantly depreciate…
… A combination of increased value-added tax
and lower payroll tax (Greece
could easily do both) mimics a currency devaluation…
… They must hold growth in wages to the euro
area’s rate of inflation plus any increase in national productivity…
We
disagree, and not just because the immediate
costs of an exit would be enormous. Even after that penalty was paid, resurrecting national currencies and
regaining control of monetary policy would create as many problems as they
solved.
The euro
secessionists’ reasoning goes like this: Suppose Greece somehow resolves its
short-term debt problems through default or other means and brings its budget
deficits back under control. It will still have to deal with a crippling lack
of competitiveness.
Labor costs
in Greece have risen much
faster in recent years than in Germany
and the rest of the euro core, making its exports expensive and imports cheap.
The result is chronic trade deficits,
which must be financed through continued borrowing.
If Greece still
had a drachma to devalue, it could cut the price of its exports and raise the
price of its imports that way. Because it doesn’t, it has to restore
competitiveness more brutally: by cutting wages, which in turn requires
persistently high unemployment to suppress workers’ bargaining power. The
present recession is bad enough, goes the argument. Extending it indefinitely
would be politically impossible and an economic disaster. That leaves an exit
from the euro system as the only choice.
The trouble
is, leaving the euro would be an even
bigger economic disaster. It would cause a run on Greek banks as depositors
rushed to move their euros abroad before the balances could be converted to
drachmas. Also, Greek borrowers would still owe euros to foreigners. Because the new drachma would instantly depreciate,
the borrowers would have a diminished capacity to service those debts, causing
new waves of bankruptcies.
On balance,
debt restructuring plus “internal” or “fiscal” devaluation -- difficult as it
may be -- looks preferable. Explicit wage cuts, and the recession needed to
induce them, don’t have to carry the whole burden of cost adjustment. A combination of increased value-added tax
and lower payroll tax (Greece could easily do both) mimics a currency
devaluation by raising the price of imports relative to the price of
exports, lowering real wage costs by stealth. They should be part of the mix.
True, once
the accumulated cost gap has been closed in this way, Greece would
have to maintain competitiveness by keeping wages under tight control. In this
ongoing effort, a floating exchange rate might look helpful, but in practice it
would be a mixed blessing.
In theory,
persistent cost inflation can be smoothly offset by a steady devaluation of the
currency, but many countries have found controlled depreciation hard to
achieve. The typical result is high and variable inflation, recurring currency
crises, fluctuating competitiveness and needless economic uncertainty. This
experience is what commended the euro to many countries to begin with.
Inside the
system, the peripheral countries have learned a harsh lesson: They must hold growth in wages to the euro
area’s rate of inflation plus any increase in national productivity. In
countries such as Greece ,
this demands a new approach to wage bargaining by employers and unions.
Overall, though, it should be no more difficult than managing a floating
currency. And on this path the reward for success is greater: lower inflation
rates and, with luck, faster economic growth.
None of
this alters the fact that Greece ,
so slow to learn the new rules, would have been better off not joining the euro
system in the first place. But it did join, and its best bet now is to make it
work.
To contact
the Bloomberg View editorial board: view@bloomberg.net.
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